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 2 The Values UnderlyingInformed Consent 
What are the values that ought to guide decisionmaking in the
provider-patient relationship or by which the success of a particular
interaction can be judged? The Commission finds two to be central:
promotion of a patient’s well-being and respect for a patient’s self-
determination.1 Before turning to the components of informed consent
(Part Two of this Report) or the means for promoting its achievement
(Part Three), these central values will be explored. They are in many
ways compatible, but their potential for conflict in actual practice must
be recognized.2
1 Although these principles have been discussed in judicial decisions and legal
commentary on informed consent, the concern of the Commission with patient-
provider communication and with decisionmaking in health care in general
causes it to consider the issue in a way that is broader and more complex than the
legal doctrine. The implications of this discussion for law are noted at
appropriate points, however, and conclusions about those implications are given
in Part Three. 
2 Pursuit of these two values is constrained in various ways, most notably by
society’s overall interest in equity, justice, and maximum social welfare. These
issues are the central concerns of the Commission’s forthcoming report
SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE. Because these goals need not be
central to the decisionmaking process of patients and providers, this report does
not take up the complications arising from conflicts between legitimate societal
goals and individual patient goals. The Commission’s forthcoming report on
decisions about life-sustaining therapy explores the relationship between societal
and individual concerns in the context of a particular set of health care decisions. 
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Serving the Patient’s Well-Being 
Therapeutic interventions are intended first and foremost to 
improve a patient’s health. In most circumstances, people agree in a 
general way on what “improved health” means. Restoration of normal 
functioning (such as the repair of a fractured limb) and avoidance of 
untimely death (such as might occur without the use of antibiotics to 
control life-threatening infections in otherwise healthy persons) are 
obvious examples. Health care is, in turn, usually a means of promoting 
patients’ well-being. The connection between a particular health care 
decision and an individual’s well-being is not perfect, however. First, the 
definition of health can be quite controversial: does wrinkled skin or 
uncommonly short stature constitute impaired health, such that surgical 
repair or growth hormone is appropriate? Even more substantial 
variation can be found in ranking the importance of health with other 
goals in an individual’s life. For some, health is a paramount value; for 
others—citizens who volunteer in time of war, nurses who care for 
patients with contagious diseases, hang-glider enthusiasts who risk life 
and limb—a different goal sometimes has primacy. 
Absence of Objective Medical Criteria. Even the most mundane 
case—in which there is little if any disagreement that some intervention 
will promote health—may well have no objective medical criteria that 
specify a single best way to achieve the goal. A fractured limb can be 
repaired in a number of ways; a life-threatening infection can be treated 
with a variety of antibiotics; mild diabetes is subject to control by diet, 
by injectable natural insulin, or by oral synthetic insulin substitutes. 
Health care professionals often reflect their own value preferences when 
they favor one alternative over another; many are matters of choice, 
dictated neither by biomedical principles or data nor by a single, agreed-
upon professional standard. 
In the Commission’s survey it was clear that professionals 
recognize this fact: physicians maintained that decisional authority 
between them and their patients should depend on the nature of the 
decision at hand. Thus, for example, whether a pregnant woman over 35 
should have amniocentesis was viewed as largely a patient’s decision, 
whereas the decision of which antibiotic to use for strep throat was seen 
as primarily up to the doctor. Furthermore, on the question of whether to 
continue aggressive treatment for a cancer patient with metastases in 
whom such treatment had already failed, two-thirds of the physicians felt 
it was not a scientific, medical decision, but one that turned principally 
on personal values. And the same proportion felt the decision should be 
made jointly (which 64% of the doctors claimed it usually was). 
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Patient’s Reasonable Subjective Preferences. Determining what 
constitutes health and how it is best promoted also requires knowledge 
of patients’ subjective preferences. In pursuit of the other goals and 
interests besides health that society deems legitimate, patients may prefer 
one type of medical intervention to another, may opt for no treatment at 
all, or may even request some treatment when a practititoner would 
prefer to follow a more conservative course that involved, at least for the 
moment, no medical intervention. For example, a slipped disc may be 
treated surgically or with medications and bed rest. Which treatment is 
better can be unclear, even to a physician. A patient may prefer surgery 
because, despite its greater risks, in the past that individual has spent 
considerable time in bed and become demoralized and depressed. A 
person with an injured knee, when told that surgery has about a 30% 
chance of reducing pain but almost no chance of eliminating it entirely, 
may prefer to leave the condition untreated. And a baseball pitcher with 
persistent inflammation of the elbow may prefer to take cortisone on a 
continuing basis even though the doctor suggests that a new position on 
the team would eliminate the inflammation permanently. In each case 
the goals and interests of particular patients incline them in different 
directions not only as to how, but even as to whether, treatment should 
proceed. 
Given these two considerations—the frequent absence of objective 
medical criteria and the legitimate subjective preferences of patients—
ascertaining whether a health care intervention will, if successful, 
promote a patient’s well-being is a matter of individual judgment. 
Societies that respect personal freedom usually reach such decisions by 
leaving the judgment to the person involved. 
The Boundaries of Health Care. This does not mean, however, 
that well-being and self-determination are really just two terms for the 
same value. For example, when an individual (such as a newborn baby) 
is unable to express a choice, the value that guides health care 
decisionmaking is the promotion of well-being-not necessarily an easy 
task but also certainly not merely a disguised form of self-determination. 
Moreover, the promotion of well-being is an important value even 
in decisions about patients who can speak for themselves because the 
boundaries of the interventions that health professionals present for 
consideration are set by the concept of well-being. Through societal 
expectations and the traditions of the professions, health care providers 
are committed to helping patients and to avoiding harm. Thus, the well-
being principle circumscribes the range of alternatives offered to 
patients: informed consent does not mean that patients can insist upon 
anything they might want. Rather, it is a choice among medically 
accepted and available options, all of which 
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are believed to have some possibility of promoting the patient’s welfare.
including always the option of no further medical interventions, even
when that would not be viewed as preferable by the health care
providers. 
In sum, promotion of patient well-being provides the primary
warrant for health care. But, as indicated, well-being is not a concrete
concept that has a single definition or that is solely within the
competency of health care providers to define. Shared decisionmaking
requires that a practitioner seek not only to understand each patient’s
needs and develop reasonable alternatives to meet those needs but also to
present the alternatives in a way that enables patients to choose one they
prefer. To participate in this process, patients must engage in a dialogue
with the practitioner and make their views on well-being clear. The
majority of physicians (56%) and the public (64%) surveyed by the
Commission felt that increasing the patient’s role in medical
decisionmaking would improve the quality of health care.3
Since well-being can be defined only within each individual’s
experience, it is in most circumstances congruent to self-determination,
to which the Report now turns. 
 
Respecting Self - Determination 
Self-determination (sometimes termed “autonomy”) is an
individual’s exercise of the capacity to form, revise, and pursue personal
plans for life.4 Although it clearly has a much broader application, the
relevance of self-determination in health care decisions seems
undeniable. A basic reason to honor an individual’s choices about health
care has already emerged in this Report: under most circumstances the
outcome that will best promote the person’s well-being rests on a
subjective judgment about the individual. This can be termed the instru-
mental value of self-determination. 
More is involved in respect for self-determination than just the
belief that each person knows what’s best for him- or herself, however.
Even if it could be shown that an expert (or a computer) could do the job
better, the worth of the individual, as acknowledged in Western ethical
traditions and especially 
3 Many physicians and patients said they believed an increased patient role 
would give the patient a better understanding of the medical condition and
treatment, would improve physician performance in terms of the honesty and
scope of discussion, and would generally improve the doctor-patient relationship. 
However, a number of physicians claimed that greater patient involvement would
improve the quality of care because it would improve compliance and would
make patients more cooperative and willing to accept the doctor’s judgment. 
4 Gerald Dworkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent (1982), Appendix G, 
Volume Three of this Report, at section 5. 
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in Anglo-American law, provides an independent—and more
important—ground for recognizing self-determination as a basic
principle in human relations, particularly when matters as important as
those raised by health care are at stake. This noninstrumental aspect can
be termed the intrinsic value of self-determination. 
Intrinsic Value of Self-Determination. The value of self-
determination readily emerges if one considers what is lost in its
absence. If a physician selects a treatment alternative that satisfies a
patient’s individual values and goals rather than allowing the patient to
choose, the absence of self-determination has not interfered with the
promotion of the patient’s well-being. But unless the patient has
requested this course of conduct, the individual will not have been
shown proper respect as a person nor provided with adequate protection
against arbitrary, albeit often well-meaning, domination by others. Self-
determination can thus be seen as both a shield and a sword. 
Freedom from interference. Self-determination as a shield is 
valued for the freedom from outside control it is intended to provide. It 
manifests the wish to be an instrument of one’s own and “not of other 
men’s acts of will.”5 In the context of health care, self-determination 
overrides practitioner-determination even if providers were able to 
demonstrate that they could (generally or in a specific instance) 
accurately assess the treatment an informed patient would choose. To 
permit action on the basis of a professional’s assessment rather than on a 
patient’s choice would deprive the patient of the freedom not to be 
forced to do something—whether or not that person would 
5 Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford (1969) at 118-38. 
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agree with the choice. Moreover, denying self-determination in this way 
risks generating the frustration people feel when their desires are ignored
or countermanded. 
The potential for dissatisfaction in this regard is great. In the
Commission’s survey, 72% of the public said that they would prefer to 
make decisions jointly with their physicians after treatment alternatives
have been explained. In contrast, 88% of the physicians believe that
patients want doctors to choose for them the best alternative. Despite
these differences in perception, only 7% of the public reports 
dissatisfaction with their doctors’ respect for their treatment preferences.6
Creative self-agency. As a sword, self-determination manifests the 
value that Western culture places on each person having the freedom to
be a creator—“a subject, not an object.”7 Within the broad framework of 
personal characteristics fixed during the years of development,
individuals define their own particular values.8 In these ways, individuals 
are capable of creating their own character and of taking responsibility 
for the kind of person they are. Respect for self-determination thus 
promotes personal integration within a chosen life-style. 
This is an especially important goal to be nourished regarding
health care. If it is not fostered regarding such personal matters, it may 
not arise generally regarding public matters. The sense of personal
responsibility for decisionmaking is one of the wellsprings of a
democracy. Similarly, when people feel little real power over their
lives—in the economy, in political affairs, or even in their daily
interactions with other people and institutions—it is not surprising that 
they are passive in encounters with health care professionals. 
If people have been able to form their own values and goals, are free
from manipulation, and are aware of information relevant to the decision
at hand, the final aspect of self-determination is simply the awareness 
that the choice is their own to make. Although the reasons for a choice
cannot always be defined, decisions are still autonomous if they reflect 
someone’s own purposes rather than external causes unrelated to the
person’s “self.” Consequently, the Commission’s concept 
6 This finding should be viewed cautiously since it is well known that surveys
overstate the extent of actual satisfaction, as measured during on-site interviews 
immediately following doctor-patient encounters. 
7 Berlin, supra note 5. 
8 This is not to deny, of course, people’s interdependence nor the ways in which
each person’s values are influenced by others. But people either incorporate or 
reject such influences into their own conception of what is good. In this view,
self-determination lies in the relation between people’s values and their actual
desires and actions. An individual is self-determined or autonomous when that 
person is the kind of person he or she wants to be. Self-determination does not 
imply free will in the sense of a will free of causal determination. 
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of health care decisionmaking includes informing patients of alternative 
courses of treatment and of the reasoning behind all recommendations. 
Self-determination involves more than choice; it also requires 
knowledge. 
The importance of information to self-determination emerged in the 
Commission’s study of treatment refusals in hospitals. There it was 
found that, regarding routine treatments, information was frequently so 
lacking that patient self-determination was compromised. 
Often patients were not told what treatment or procedure had 
been ordered for them, much less asked to decide whether or not 
to accept it. The purpose of the procedure was frequently obscure 
and the risks commonly went unmentioned. Presentation of 
alternatives was extraordinarily rare. The main concern of the 
patients we interviewed was not to select the best treatment from 
those available, but to find out what was being selected for them 
and why.9
Implications of Self-Determination. Despite the importance of 
self-determination, its exercise is sometimes impermissible and at other 
times impossible. That is, society sometimes must impose restrictions on 
the range of acceptable patient choices; at other times, patients either 
cannot, or at least do not, exercise self-determination. 
External limitations. Two restrictions are recognized on the range 
of patient decisions that should be respected. First, some objectives are 
so contrary to the public interest or the interests of others that society 
bars the use of medical interventions toward these ends. For example, 
physicians may 
9 Paul S. Appelbaum and Loren H. Roth, Treatment Refusal In Medical
Hospitals (1982), Appendix D, in Volume Two of this Report. Although this lack
of information and resulting patient noninvolvement in decisionmaking seems to
have been a cause of treatment refusal they also occurred in many cases in which
patients did not refuse treatment. Nonprovision of relevant information was also
observed in the other on-site study. 
One caveat must be noted, however. The Appelbaum-Roth team observed
house-staff/patient interactions extensively but generally did not have a chance to
observe interactions between attending physicians and patients. One would
expect that discussions of major treatments and procedures, especially major
surgical procedures, which were more often left to the attendings, might
correspond more closely to the doctrine of informed consent. However, the
investigators’ conclusions are probably valid for the discussions about diagnostic
procedures, medications, and adjunctive therapies as discussed in the other
observational study conducted for the Commission. See Charles W. Lidz and
Alan Meisel, Informed Consent and the Structure of Medical Care (1982),
Appendix C, in Volume Two of this Report. 
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not assist patients in criminal activity (such as defacing fingertips so they 
will not leave identifiable fingerprints). The professional norms or moral 
integrity of health care professionals (individually, or collectively in 
health care institutions) may also conflict with the desires of a patient. 
When this occurs, the practitioner must first reexamine his or her own 
beliefs and preconceptions. If the proposed intervention would actually 
compromise the provider’s integrity or standards, the patient will either 
have to accept the limitation on available interventions or seek another 
health care provider. Finally, a particular treatment preferred by a patient 
occasionally calls on very scarce resources that society (or some 
legitimate resource-controlling segment of the health care system) has 
decided to allocate to another use. Even as a “sword,” self-determination 
does not invest a patient with rights to demand use of resources that have 
legitimately been allocated to others—as in the case, for example, of a 
patient who cannot have elective surgery on a desired date because all 
beds in a hospital are being used by disaster victims. 
A second limitation on self-determination arises when a person’s 
decisionmaking is so defective or mistaken that the decision fails to 
promote the person’s own values or goals. This can happen in many 
ways: someone could fail to understand relevant information, such as the 
risks of a particular treatment, or unconsciously distort unpleasant 
information, such as the frightening diagnosis of cancer, and so forth. 
For example, a man in the prime of a full and rewarding life who has 
great plans for the future suddenly suffers a myocardial infarction in the 
middle of a poker game in which he has already won handsomely. Yet he 
refuses to permit himself to be transported to a hospital because he wants 
to play out his hand. The quality of his decisionmaking capacity is 
certainly in doubt. If his expressed wishes are respected nonetheless, the 
results in terms of self-determination would be mixed. Self-determina-
tion would be promoted in the sense that he has made the decision for 
himself, as opposed to having someone else make it, but self-
determination would be contravened in that the decision is not the one 
that would best advance the man’s apparent wish to live a long, full life. 
Self-determination is valuable in both its roles—in letting an 
individual be his or her own decisionmaker and in securing each 
person’s own goals. In situations where there is a choice of respecting 
the individual’s decision or overriding it—that is, of favoring one aspect 
of self-determination at the expense of the other—overriding an 
individual decision is usually justified on the ground of promotion of 
well-being rather than of respect for self-choice.10
10 Likewise, self-determination is not an adequate guiding principle regarding 
decisions for persons who suffer permanent or chronic 
 Values Underlying Informed Consent   49 
The absence of contemporaneous choice. Sometimes people
anticipate that they will be unable to participate in future decisions about
their own health care. A patient, for example, may be under anesthesia
during surgery at a time when diagnostic tests force a decision about a
further operation. Similarly, patients with an early diagnosis of senile
dementia of the Alzheimer’s type can expect that their physical
functioning might continue long after they are mentally incapable of
deciding about care. Through an “advance directive” such people can
specify the types of care they want (or do not want) to receive or the
person they want to make such decisions if they are unable to do so.11
Honoring such a directive shows respect for self-determination in that it
fulfills two of its three underlying values. 
First, following a directive, particularly one that gives specific
instructions about types of acceptable and unacceptable interventions,
fulfills the instrumental role of self-determination by providing
reassurance that a course of conduct promotes the patient’s subjective,
individual evaluation of well-being. Second, honoring the directive
shows respect for the patient as a person. To disregard it would be nearly
as great an insult as to disregard the wishes of a patient who expresses
them at that time. 
An advance directive does not, however, provide self-determination
in the sense of active moral agency by the patient on his or her own
behalf.12 Although any discussion between patient and health care
professional leading up to a directive would involve active participation
and shared decisionmaking, that would have been in the past by the time
the decision actually needs to be made about the patient’s health care. At
that point, there is no “self,” in the active, mental sense, to determine
what should be done. 
mental impairment, such as those who are severely mentally retarded or 
demented, who are incapable of forming a set of values or of applying them in 
particular decisions. The decisions for these patients rest instead on an assessment 
of what would promote their “best interests” (i.e., well-being); see pp. 178-80 
infra. 
For an interesting example of some of the difficulties that may exist in 
determining whether an individual’s choice reflects his or her long-term goals and 
values, see Albert R. Jonsen, Mark Siegler, and William J. Winslade, CLINICAL 
ETHICS, Macmillan Publishing Co., New York (1982) at 78-81. 
11 In the Commission’s survey, 36% of the public reported that they have given 
instructions to someone about how they would like to be treated if they become 
too sick to make decisions, although only 23% of those instructions are in 
writing. 
12 See generally Paul Ramsey, THE PATIENT AS PERSON, Yale University 
Press, New Haven (1970). 
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Consequently, self-determination is involved when a patient
establishes a way to project his or her wishes into a time of anticipated
incapacity. Yet it is a sense of self-determination lacking in one
important attribute: active, contemporaneous personal choice. Hence a
decision not to follow an advance directive may sometimes be justified
even when it would not be ethical to disregard a competent patient’s
contemporaneous choice,13
Active participation. Because patient noninvolvement in treatment
decisions occurs frequently in medical care,14 it is important to
understand whether it is compatible with patient self-determination. First
and foremost, patients must be aware that they are entitled to make a
decision about treatment rather than merely acquiescing in a
professional’s recommendation. Some patients feel, for example, that
making a particular treatment decision will cause them great distress, or
that the complexity and uncertainty of certain decisions make them poor
decisionmakers and that trusted physicians or family members would be
more likely to choose the treatment most in accord with the patients’
own goals and values. Alternatively, some patients simply wish others to
decide so that they can spend their time and energy on other matters.
This, too, could constitute a transfer of the right to decide. 
In contrast, some patients defer to physicians because they believe
they have no business interfering in the exercise of medical judgment.
Such patients do not think they are transferring their “right to decide” to
a physician because they do not in the first place believe they have any
right to decide about medical treatment. This is not an exercise of self-
determination. Rather, self-determination occurs when patients
understand decisions are theirs to make—and also to countermand if
they are dissatisfied.15 In other words, self-determination requires that
patients either make a choice or actually give the decisionmaking
authority to another, not merely fail to act out of fear or ignorance of
their rights.16
13 In some states, advance directives made pursuant to a statute may achieve
“binding” legal effect (subject, usually, to considerable room for interpretation).
See pp. 155-66 infra. In such a case, whatever the moral justifications, one may
not be legally justified in disregarding the directions. 
14 One of the observational studies conducted for the Commission concludes that
“on balance the normative patient role in [health care decisionmaking] is one of
passive acquiescence.” Lidz and Meisel, supra note 9, at section 6. 
15 A possible exception to this requirement would be an irrevocable grant of
decisionmaking power to another, as when Odysseus, wishing both to hear and
to resist the lure of the Sirens’ call, had himself tied to the mast of his ship and
instructed his crew not to release him however much he might entreat them to do
so. 
16 The critical element is the patient’s attitude toward “involvement” 
  
In recognizing that a self-determining person may waive active
involvement in each decision, the Commission does not intend to belittle
the moral ideal of the free, self-governing person who attempts to make
decisions responsibly by applying his or her own values to relevant facts
during deliberations about alternative actions. The ideal certainly
justifies encouraging patients to play an active part in treatment decisions
and argues for structuring medical practices and institutions in ways that
facilitate and encourage effective patient participation. Nevertheless, it
remains a moral ideal—people may strive to meet it but will often fall
short of it. The principle of self-determination, the bedrock on which the
Commission’s concept of shared decisionmaking in health care rests, is
best understood as respecting people’s right to define and pursue their
own view of what is good, which is compatible with people freely giving
to others the authority to make particular health care decisions for them. 
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in the decision, not the mere existence of some “delegation,” for all decisions 
about matters as complex as medical care require a large measure of delegation. 
Self-determination is not lacking simply because a patient does not insist that the 
physician review the reasoning and empirical evidence that led up to the 
physician’s recommendation (and its alternatives, if any), including each stand-
ardized laboratory test, each anatomical or metabolic finding, and so forth. 
Rather, patients’ decisions are always the end points of a long series of earlier 
choices made by physicians and others (where many of the steps in action and 
reasoning are so ingrained that those involved do not even recognize them for the 
choices they are). What is at issue, then, is merely the degree of delegation of 
decisionmaking authority by the patient to the professional, not the fact of 
delegation. While some patients want to explore every hypothesis, others want to 
know only the final recommendation; both may be exercising appropriate self-
determination. 
 
